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David Auerbach on literature, tech, film, etc.

Tag: politics (page 15 of 15)

Foundations and Empire

You can say all you want about push polls, badly phrased questions, the sort of dullards who have the time to waste on phone polls, wartime jingoism, etc., etc., but still, this ain’t good:

More than three-fourths of Americans–including two-thirds of liberals and 70% of Democrats –now say they support the decision to go to war. And more than four-fifths of these war supporters say they still will back the military action even if allied forces don’t find evidence of weapons of mass destruction.

“Support” is a loaded word and it appears that the 4/5 figure is closer to 3/5, but you can check out the pdf for more stunners, like the result that only 12% of the pollees said that the Iraqi people are not “welcoming the presence of U.S. troops in their country…because they oppose the U.S. invading their land.” Maybe that’s because 69% of them get their news from “Cable news shows.” I’m still not so jaded that this all doesn’t give me a sock in the gut.

Anyway, enough sensationalism about polls. The Pessoan Wealth Bondage briefly sheds his Paglian personae to discuss the difficulty in combatting what See the Forest describes as the Alinskyan moving of the goalposts:

The Republicans are now just an extension of the Scaife/Coors/Bradley, etc.-funded web of ideological think tanks and advocacy organizations–Heritage, Horowitz, Federalist Society, etc.–that call themselves “movement conservatives.” They have this magnificent “message amplification infrastructure” in place – the “Wurlitzer”–that is able to move the public more and more to the right, and their politicians just rest on top of that.

The WB responds with a pessimistic, expert analysis of the imbalance of forces, with a few long-term prescriptions for change:

Commweal is trying to be a populist counterpoise to Heritage and Cato, but has not got the bucks. When you go to a man who runs a billion dollar family business in a regulated industry, it is easy to explain to him why it might make sense to make a tax deductible gift of the interest on the interest on his money to Cato, to repeal the regulations that vex him. It is much tougher to make an equally cogent case for the common good.

But all the money in the world can’t turn this mess around in any short amount of time. The Right had a thirty year project that succeeded wildly, but it took time to reach the level of single-mindedness that See the Forest describes. Even after you read Mark Hertzgaard’s On Bended Knee, which describes the pandering of the press and the excuses they made for Reagan, it’s noticeable that due to Democratic control of Congress, some remaining press independence, or other factors, Iran-Contra still “happened.” The positions of the goalposts would not allow it on the radar now.

So even for them, these things took time. But I’m not in the mood to wait around for the supposed Emerging Democratic Majority to emerge. The crisis point seems too close. And it’s harder to foment a majority than to break one, as Ray Davis suggests:

Introduce enough irresolvable conflicts, and the “right” coalition would splinter into factions almost as nicely as the “left”: it has in the past, and it can again. (Bearing in mind, of course, that, no matter what loose coalitions might be in play, the most powerful single faction in American politics will continue to be, as it’s been since the Civil War, that represented by corporate lobbyists.)

It has to be a bad sign when that last, parenthetical sentence reads as a statement of optimism rather than despair. But that’s where I am right now. Temporarily, the preservation of a neo-liberal market with ludicrous income inequity and a lack of checks on corporatism is looking better than all other feasible alternatives (isolationist protectionism, aggressive warmongering imperialism, total multipolar chaos) in the short-term. Maybe it’s a lack of imagination on my part, or a lack of empathy for the victims of its tremendous defects, but what is going on right now is not in the interests of a majority of corporate lobbyists, even in this country. You don’t see articles like the Financial Times calling Bush’s economic policy “lunacy” unless at least the beginning of a rift similar to what Ray describes is forming. The best thing to do is help it along.

My response to the Tutor of WB, then, is that not all right-wing foundations pose equally frightening agendas, nor are they all marching in lockstep as much as current events suggest. The neocons and fundamentalists at Heritage and AEI are not the same as the welfare-bashing libertarians at Cato. It would not be the end of the world for progressives to welcome Cato into the fold temporarily, since they too have expressed reservations (see their Why the United States Should Not Attack Iraq”) about the current direction of the U.S. policy. In the face of patent financial mismanagement, there is room for a schism.

Of course, maybe the free-marketers don’t need us and can just fight it out amongst themselves. But in the face of the left-wing impotence that all the people I’ve quoted bemoan, one potential short-term approach is a strategic alliance–I don’t know what form it would take–between the progressive sorts and those who want a tax cut, easy living, and a reduction of inculcated fear. Sanity precedes social justice.

C. Wright Mills: The Malaise of Anticipation

Attempts to reinstate the old emphasis on the power of man’s intelligence to control his destiny have not been taken up by American intellectuals, spurred as they are by new worries, seeking as they are for new gods. Suffering the tremors of men who face defeat, they are worried and distraught, some only half aware of their condition, others so painfully aware that they must obscure their knowledge by rationalistic busy-work and many forms of self-deception.

No longer can they read, without smirking or without bitterness, Dewey’s brave words, ‘Every thinker puts some portion of an apparently stable world in peril,’ or Bertrand Russell’s ‘Thought looks into the face of hell and is not afraid,’ much less Marx’s notion that the role of the philosopher was not to interpret but to change the world. Now they hear Charles Péguy: ‘No need to conceal this from ourselves: we are defeated. For ten years, for fifteen years, we have done nothing but lose ground. Today, in the decline, in the decay of political and private morals, literally we are beleagured. We are in a place which is in a state of siege and more than blockaded and all the flat country is in the hands of the enemy.’ What has happened is that the terms of acceptance of American life have been made bleak and superficial at the same time that the terms of revolt have been made vulgar and irrelevant.

C. Wright Mills, White Collar, 1951

Today he would be wrong: they don’t hear anyone but themselves. But there is an appeal to the passage right around now, in its generals rather than its specifics, just as the Pé quote is taken rather out of context. There is nothing ironic about these words except for when they were written, in a period closer in spirit to the early 1990’s than today. So take a slight bit of hope, or at least perspective, from the knowledge that the above will always apply.

Mills’s next step was an embrace of Cuban communist rule, and its motivations are the mirror image of those in the above passage. It’s not a sign of weakness from Mills, but neither is it quite as clear-sighted as it intends to be.

Saul Alinsky: Who are you going to believe, me or your own eyes?

The rather hermetic Wealth Bondage salutes relentless and tireless agitator Saul Alinsky. It’s always hard to take Alinsky’s writing at face value since his entire life strategy revolved around manipulating people into doing what he thought was in their best interest.

If you ask me, he was often fairly on the mark, but he was not one to waste time ingenuously explaining his agenda, unless it was going to further it. In Rules for Radicals, he seems much more interested in presenting his strategies for leading and guiding undirected masses of people than he is in explaining what particular direction he’s taking, or why. His tactics look great if, unlike me, you have an a priori political orientation, but in rejecting the concept of independent thought, he always depressed me.

Since he was determined to work with people’s existing preconceptions and value systems, which hardly cause them to act in their own best interests, the best that can be managed if two people deploy Alinsky’s tactics is a stalemate, or an arbitrary victory. And so the most recent huge of radicals remaining within people’s own experience is described in Josh Green’s “The Other War Room, as skillful a deployment of Alinsky’s tactics as any.

[PS: I think I’ve changed my mind.]

Death in Rome, Wolfgang Koeppen

There’s a huge drop-off in big novels of ideas in the Germanic areas post-World War II. Mann, Broch, Musil, Schnitzler, Doblin, Stefan Zweig, and Joseph Roth all oriented themselves around fairly articulable ideologies, some more complex than others. Post-war, there are phantasmagorias like Gunter Grass’s and overwrought character studies like Boll’s, but very little that compares to something like The Magic Mountain. Even Doctor Faustus seems like it’s avoiding the issue.

Wolfgang Koeppen, at least in Death in Rome, sounds the death-knell for the old guard. The ideas are as good as Broch on an off-day, and are better than than Zweig. Koeppen just doesn’t spend as much time on his ideas. The three main characters–a larger-than-life evil Nazi bastard named Judejahn, his son Adolf, who is a priest-in-training, and his nephew, a modern composer–all only have one remotely validated emotion, which is disgust. After making a point about local politics, modern composition, the priesthood, schooling, or any other relevant topic, Koeppen immediately buries it under negative images and recriminations. Koeppen takes pains to paint the three’s only moments of virtue as ones of total inaction.

While they and their fellow Germans aren’t doing anything, for three-quarters of the book, Koeppen’s lyricism sustains a sublime, frozen-in-amber quality, as they all walk through historical Rome. Koeppen is expert at displaying the unmoored thoughts of the most morally culpable people imaginable, Judejahn for being a monster like something out of The Night Porter, and his scions for having anything to do with his legacy. It’s when something does happen that the book falls apart, since no plot can live up to the transcendent monstrousness that Koeppen deals in.

The ideas, very negative ones, do come through, but are dispatched far more quickly than usual, since the characters are so terminal. That isn’t to say that tje ideas are so different than what went before. Like Broch circa The Sleepwalkers, Death in Rome has a vaguely conservative bent. Aside from the characters, its hatred is directed to Nietzsche and Hegel, who removed simple morality/religion/ethics and replaced it with high-minded, poisonous ideas. But Broch had no problem writing a verbose treatise about the breakdown of decency. Koeppen seems to say that the rationalistic style of Broch, Mann, and the rest is an abscess spawned by amoral philosophers, and that it must be dispatched.

This makes Death in Rome intentionally self-defeating, its message being that the big rational style must go underground in German literature. And so it has. But it also suggests that there is still a continuity of content: the rational arguments live on in disguised and more chaotic form in Grass, Peter Handke, Thomas Bernhard, and many others. So instead of there being such a clean break of content, it’s more a change of style. Koeppen would never write something like this, from near the end of The Sleepwalkers:

Of course the question is not whether Hegel’s interpetation of history has been overthrown by the World War; that had been done already by the stars in their courses; for a reality that had grown autonomous through a development extending over four hundred years would have ceased in any circumstances to be capable of submitting any longer to a deductive system.

The Sleepwalkers, Broch, pp. 559-560.

But Koeppen would agree with the main point, which is that theories of the end of history lead to amoral chaos.

If Koeppen is acknowledging that the change is in style rather than substance, he’s far more pessimistic and nihilistic than he appears. He is condemning any future German culture without knowing what it is. He anticipates and transcends many of Grass’s more particular arguments about German memory decades later.

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