Waggish

David Auerbach on literature, tech, film, etc.

Tag: politics (page 14 of 15)

A Mind Forever Voyaging

This was one of those old Infocom text adventures, one of their most ambitious, and one of their least successful. It came out around 1987, when they had pretty much exhausted the cave crawl (Zork, Enchanter, etc.) genre and were branching out in whatever directions appealed to them, as graphics games slowly eroded their market share. This was not helped by their ill-advised foray into relational databases, Cornerstone (aka Gravestone), but AMFV came at a time when the future still looked relatively bright. Steve Meretzky (Hitchhiker’s Guide, Sorcerer, Leather Goddesses of Phobos) would never attempt anything so ambitious, or so earnest, again.

The game is the only explicitly political game in their catalog, an exercise in liberal agitprop/hysteria. You play a supercomputer who is going to test out a “simulation” of the future after the adoption of an ominous right-wing “Plan for Renewed National Purpose.” Unsurprisingly, it’s a disaster; forty years into the future, the world doesn’t just suck, it’s literally hell on earth, with gangs and vagrants occupying what used to be civilization. The apocalypse comes through pure social decline. You expose this grim future to people in the real world, and a different, liberal plan of social welfare, compassion, and peace is adopted, yielding paradise on earth shortly thereafter.

So the politics are callow, but not much more so than your average John Brunner book. But check out the Plan itself:

The Plan for Renewed National Purpose, Legislative action: * cut tax rates by fifty percent * vigorous prosecution of tax evasion * decentralization of federal responsibilities * deregulation of all major industries * reinstatement of the military draft * emphasis on fundamentals and traditional values in education * mandatory conscription for troublemakers and criminals * a strict “USA First” trade policy * termination of aid to nations not pro-USA * cutbacks on all types of bureaucracy, e.g. registering cars, guns * termination of government subsidies to outmoded industries

The Plan for Renewed National Purpose, Constitutional amendments: * increase the powers of the Executive Branch * increase the Presidential term of office to eight years

Draw your own conclusions.

Benny Morris: “Survival of the Fittest”

The work situation’s slowed down Proust a bit, but I wanted to give a mention of Benny Morris’s Survival of the Fittest interview with Ha’aretz, which has been making its way around the blogs.

(Though just linking to the thing is tough enough now that Ha’aretz has taken the original page down. Free Republic, Counterpunch, and LGF all have the original text, and I’m not keen on linking to them or most of the other places that have copied it.)

Aside from demonsrating that Morris has no career as a Likud PR man, it’s a very articulate depiction of the bunker mentality. I haven’t read all of Morris’s Israel history; I read excerpts for comparison while reading Avi Shlaim‘s book. Shlaim dabbled in counterfactuals on the order of, “If Ben-Gurion hadn’t done X, there might have been peace, but we’ll never know.” Morris, slightly to Shlaim’s right at the time, tended to stick with military history over politics and let whatever stains were there speak for themselves.

Now Morris is not so reticent, but I don’t see such a huge contradiction with his previous positions…it appears to be an avoidance of cognitive dissonance that leads him to dwell on those things that most partisans would gloss over or deny. For someone who wrote in English first and then translated his history into Hebrew, it’s a drastic turn inward. The polite but rather slanted interviews he did with Barak in the NYRB seem to be things of the past.

My own reaction: I can’t imagine the interview convincing anyone who wasn’t already convinced. It’s a portrayal of a state of mind, not an argument.

1.2 Combray

Deep in the realm of Marcel’s youth, his extended family, and the people of the town of Combray, where one person not knowing another is shocking. It’s probably not a common association, but I think of that dusty, windswept Texas town in the movie of The Last Picture Show and how every possible interpersonal combination has to be explored by the inhabitants (and the author) just to distract themselves from how desolate the whole place is.
This isn’t to say that Combray works in the same way, but the centrality of Combray and its removal from Paris, to the point where it seems out of time and most larger context, acts as the main limiter of what the youth Marcel is exposed to in this section. In the preface the world was the size of his bedroom, which he wanted his mother to re-enter; now it’s the size of an idyllic small town.
It’s not just him. The attraction he feels to the plain, unnoteworthy church of Combray is shared by his grandmother. The implication: objects are granted aesthetic significance by those people who project their memories onto it.
A few character studies are striking:
The fall of M. Legrandin: Legrandin is an effete snob who, initially respected by Marcel’s family, falls from favor after Marcel induces his family to tie him in knots over the fact that he’s not quite as high and mighty as he claims to be. (The actual circumstances are too twisty to summarize easily.) It only takes a single gesture on his behalf to convince Marcel that his act isn’t justified.
M. Vinteuil and his daughter: Vinteuil has no idea how rotten and amoral his daughter is, and by the time she spits on his picture (a terrible act by the standards at work here), he’s already dead. He’s much gossipped about, but he himself never realizes.
Francoise and Leonie: Leonie is Marcel’s aunt, Francoise her cook. Leonie hasn’t been doing well and has thrown all sorts of paranoid accusations at Francoise, who’s weathered them as best as possible. Yet after Leonie dies, the family realizes “the sort of terror in which Francoise had lived of my aunt’s harsh words, her suspicions and her anger, had developed in her a feeling which we had mistaken for hatred and which was really veneration and love.”
These miniatures (none take more than a couple pages to play out) all deal with conflicting representations of other people (or of one’s self). While one interpretation is designated “correct” each time, the revelation is always a tad uncertain, since it’s simply a revision of an earlier account, not a true reckoning.
In turn, it makes me wonder about the revelation of Mme de Guermantes, the local noble whom Marcel imagines so vividly without having met that, when he finally sees her, the sight doesn’t permit him to reject his fixed idea of her, but instead amplifies it. Again, it’s more of a revision than a true correction.
As, to some extent, with books. The Bergotte passage, about Marcel’s infatuation with and worship of an author, was the first that made me realize that there was a decent chance I would complete the entirety of ROTP, that no matter how many dull stories of aristocratic intrigue or explorations of uninteresting minutiae, there was enough depth to the reflection at times to keep me going through the dry patches, which I’m steeling myself for.
(Compared to Robert Musil’s The Man Without Qualities, it was a more difficult assessment. There are large dry passages in MWQ, but the payoffs are so self-contained and so dazzling in their ideological genius that the promise of continued, new treasures made it easy to keep going. Add to that the constant tension of World War I looming over all the characters and the narrative, promising to destroy all their dreams and high ideals, and the irony grants resonance to each bit of politics or theory. There is much more of a cumulative effect in Proust, with a fair amount of (so far) deadwood being thrown into the mix.)
He reads Bergotte, who’s an imagined author who deals in aethetic lyricism and symbolic images (he sounds a bit German). One passage makes a particular impression on him:

I now had the impression of being confronted not by a particular passage in one of Bergotte’s works, tracing a purely bi-dimensional figure upon the surface of my mind, but rather by the “ideal passage” of Bergotte, common to every one of his books, to which all the earlier, similar passages, now becoming merged in it, had added a kind of density and volume by which my own understanding seemed to be enlarged. (102)

And that’s why I kept reading too. It’s a better description of a reader’s revelation than anything I’ve gotten from Northrop Frye or Leavis.
This sort of experienced synecdoche (an approximate term here) returns later in Swann’s apprehension of a piece of music, so I’ll get back to it.
And finally, something that jumps off the page, Marcel’s view of women prepubescent vs. post-pubescent. He speaks of “that period of life when one has not yet separated the fact of this sensual pleasure from the various women in whose company one has tasted it, when one has not yet reduced it to a general idea which makes one regard them thenceforward as the interchangeable instruments of a pleasure that is always the same.” I don’t know if this makes him a sex-hating anti-Puritan aesthete or someone simply obsessed with multiplicities of experience.
More likely than either, it gets back to his obsession with the child’s immediate experience of sensations with less than the full complement of an adult’s prejudices, sex being one of the most dominant.

The Battle of Algiers, Gillo Pontecorvo

Of all the articles I’ve seen dissecting the decision of the Pentagon to show Gillo Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers as a primer in urban warfare by an insurgent indigenous population, none have addressed what I always thought was most interesting, the portrayal of the the triumph of the resistance as unavoidable destiny. The film’s politics are not ludicrous because of factual inaccuracies or one-dimensionally propagandist speeches, but because it’s all played as a game of dialectical materialism, in which a certain outcome will inexorably result.

The Slate article summarizes the movie, but it gives the film too much moral depth. When I watch The Battle of Algiers, Pontecorvo’s attitude is that all the actions of resistance are necessary, particularly the violent ones. The outcome is predetermined, as Colonel Mathieu implies: the proles will rise up against the oppresors, and they will win. Pontecorvo never rejects the idea of “sustained and bloody insurrection.”

(This sort of thing was popular in the 60s, and Pontecorvo is better at it than most. It’s far more politically engaging than Godard’s insane Weekend, which drags two garbagemen out in front of the camera in the middle of the picture to talk about what wonderful progress the revolution is making.)

The movie is still brilliantly effective because it is extremely rare for a movie to portray pawns of historical (Marxist) inevitability with such dignity. Viewers identify with these scared, nervous agitators, who hardly understand their own Hegelian destinies, because they slot into the role of the noble revolutionaries in Pontecorvo’s dialectical framework. They’re made noble by their role in the historical process. It’s not until after the movie finishes that you realize that you’ve bought into Frantz Fanon without even realizing it. Pauline Kael said:

The Battle of Algiers is probably the only film that has ever made middle-class audiences believe in the necessity of bombing innocent people–perhaps because Pontecorvo made it a tragic necessity…It’s practically rape of the doubting intelligence.

The sentiment is right, but I think she was slightly off the mark. Middle-class people would never sincerely believe in the need for their own self-destruction, but Pontecorvo does a good job of tricking them into sympathizing with their enemies. It’s less the tragedy that gets them than the sheer manipulation with which Pontecorvo plays up the revolutionaries and alienates viewers from the middle-classes of the film. Yet he does it in the context of macrohistorical forces, which is an amazing trick.

You have to wonder how effective it was on the Pentagon employees who watched it–probably not at all. But the real irony here, the huge irony, is that the Pentagon would air a movie that privileges ideology over facts, where the straitjacket of Marxist progression is tightly fitted over the messy (and less noble) Algerian resistance, in which the outcome is determined before the action even starts. No matter what the doubts of the individuals carrying out their historic tasks, says Pontecorvo, there was never a chance that Algiers would not be freed from French rule; first principles dictated it. There is no need for pragmatism or realism, nor for compromise, only for a decisive, inevitable show of force, destined to succeed. The distance between that vision and what actually happened in Algeria–decades more of authoritarian rule and poverty–is the real lesson the Pentagon (and the DoD, and Fox News, and the Weekly Standard, etc.) should take from the film.

“Literary Theory and Historical Understanding,” Morris Dickstein

Morris Dickstein writes on “Literary Theory and Historical Understanding” in a diffuse article that exemplifies the doom of the provider of an afterword to an anthology. He has to provide an authoritative, paternal perspective without being dismissive of the disparate viewpoints enclosed. The result is skeptical and non-reductionistic, both good, but confusingly equivocal. But I like Dickstein, and he makes some good points that bear blunt extraction.

He treats three main forms of modern literary criticism:

  • New criticism, the more classical approach of close reading, attempting to ferret out tropes and devices that form the shape of a work, usually in a vacuum-sealed context. (F.R. Leavis, Cleanth Brooks, Northrop Frye, Helen Vendler, etc.)
  • New historicism, that which roughly tries to place work in a very specific historical context, play down the individualistic nature of authorship, and show novels as products of obvious and submerged social forces. (Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Benn Michaels, Nancy Armstrong, etc.)
  • New theory, that which uses a deductive approach from some overarching framework, often political and/or Hegelian, to produce architectonic schemas to apply to work. (In my opinion this is the most varied category he uses, and can include everyone from Harold Bloom to Jacques Derrida to Tzvetan Todorov to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick to Michael Denning.)

The categories are debatable and overlap; Dickstein admits that. But despite his problems with new historicism, Dickstein essentially gives it a pass over what he says is the staid new criticism and the impotent new theory.

My instinct has always been to group theory and historicism closer together than any other pairing: both can be tremendously reductive and both are inclined to load the dice with an a priori political view which is then used to bludgeon authors into the needed positions. (Read David Lodge’s academic novels of the 70’s for treatments of both approaches.)

But Dickstein strongly pushes the view that it’s theory and new criticism that share a similar self-marginalization and conservatism. Theory, in his mind, was constructed as an apolitical ghetto:

Theory set out to revolutionize the academy, where it had taken refuge from an unsympathetic society. It aimed at a radical transformation of the interpretive disciplines, only to burden them with a sense of skepticism, disillusionment, and broken connections. During the backlash years of Nixonian demagoguery and Reaganite restoration, theory became catastrophe theory, a way of compensating for the sense of impotence, or of recouping failure by showing that it was inevitable, even as critics asserted their power over the text, their refusal to be dominated by its structures, themes, or rhetorical patterns. Emphasizing ideology over interpretation, literary scholarship became a way of seeing through literature, of not being taken in by it.

This is very extreme, basically positing theory as a defense mechanism, and a way of exerting academic superiority not just over texts, but over the common readers who allow themselves to be manipulated. As such, Dickstein paints theory as dishonest and petty. It is a thesis that has recently been taken up by Happy the Tutor. I don’t think it applies in all the cases he believes. Harold Bloom prostrating himself before the altar of Shakespeare and Derrida humbling himself before Poe, among others, seem to advocate an egalitarian engagement and sparring with texts. But both structuralist and the more extreme deconstructionist approaches do advocate such a strict reframing of the work under consideration as to evoke Hamilton Burger browbeating a witness.

Are they, by nature, apolitical, or even conservative? I don’t think the question has a definitive answer, but it’s hard to deny that very little of practical, political worth has come out of theory (Richard Rorty’s strained efforts included). And this willful seclusion has both a cause and effect relationship with the marginalization of the literary academic institution.

Does this match up with the anemic and unimaginative beast that Dickstein makes of classical close reading and new criticism? Partially. The myopic focus on linguistic devices over ideology, character, and authorial intent makes trudging through, for instance, Leavis’s dissection of T.S. Eliot heavy going, but Dickstein sells it short. To the extent that there is still a moral underpinning of the proposed reading, Leavis is selling more than mere lists of tropes. I disagree with Leavis, but at least it’s there. Now, you can say that Leavis isn’t a pardigmatic new critic and five pages of Cleanth Brooks would have me climbing the walls, and you’d be right, but the empiricism is similar, as is the lack of engagement with the world at large, which is the point on which Dickstein condemns them. But that doesn’t quite justify some of the harsher points Dickstein makes about theory, nor does it give much credence to the (heavily conditional) elevation of historism:

Historicist readings too often seem idiosyncratic, empirically tenuous, or merely suggestive. In addition, they are often all too predictable in their political sympathies. Eager to weigh in on the side of the insulted and the injured, they seem determined by their well-meaning political agendas. Yet compared with other ways of reading, they call upon a larger knowledge of the world, and often do more to link literature or theory to the actual flow of human life.

Here I’m skeptical. Analysing Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein in an exclusively feminist context is valuable, but the degree to which the interpretation crowds out all others is more blinkered than illuminating. (I’m not picking on feminist readings here: so much has been done to Hawthorne in the Puritan context that he can hardly be read for the first time. Melville survives better because his books are too big, literally and metaphorically. I do think Shelley has been done a similarly large disservice.) If the new historicists haven’t been especially good historians, they’re plugging as much a false engagement with literature as the theoreticians. But the key word is “engagement”:

The radical students I taught in the late ’60s were scarcely bent on deconstructing the residues of metaphysics in Western humanist texts. On the contrary, they responded with passion to the classics as subversive works whose humane promise remained unfulfilled. They connected with art and philosophy not because it was canonical but because it felt so fresh, so immediate — and so visionary. Blake, Dickens, Ruskin, and Lawrence seemed like their contemporaries, not the authors of musty classics. Never had the Great Books felt more relevant than when the whole direction of society was in play. The lineage of deconstruction takes us back not to the politics of the ’60s but to its ultimate betrayal and blockage.

What I come away with is Dickstein’s agenda that it’s time for critics to involve themselves in reality again, and if the new historicists are a little shallow or reductionistic, by all means condemn them, but be aware that their aims are noble and practical in the best Thomas Dewey sense. Unfortunately, I believe that this way lies social realism and dreary Upton Sinclair novels. Dickens is so absorbed in his time and place he’s his own new historian, but someone like Blake so defies a historicist reading that Dickstein’s use of him here undermines the point. While Dickstein makes a case that much theory has no place except to belittle greater authors, he basically ignores the longstanding tradition that isolation and myopia have produced in academia, which I’m not yet prepared to discount.

Dickstein makes all these criticisms and more, quite blatantly, against the new historicists, and still seems inclined to give them a break, because of the political agenda. The historians, like Dickstein did, can still serve to point would-be radicals to the ideals set forth in the classics. It’s just that by privileging the near-term practical outcome over the purity of the methodology, they are offering image over substance, much as the 60’s themselves did.

[Probably more to come on this…one afterthought is that I probably shouldn’t have used the word “political” when referring to the broader attitude of “engagement.”]

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