Waggish

David Auerbach on literature, tech, film, etc.

Month: April 2003 (page 4 of 4)

Foundations and Empire

You can say all you want about push polls, badly phrased questions, the sort of dullards who have the time to waste on phone polls, wartime jingoism, etc., etc., but still, this ain’t good:

More than three-fourths of Americans–including two-thirds of liberals and 70% of Democrats –now say they support the decision to go to war. And more than four-fifths of these war supporters say they still will back the military action even if allied forces don’t find evidence of weapons of mass destruction.

“Support” is a loaded word and it appears that the 4/5 figure is closer to 3/5, but you can check out the pdf for more stunners, like the result that only 12% of the pollees said that the Iraqi people are not “welcoming the presence of U.S. troops in their country…because they oppose the U.S. invading their land.” Maybe that’s because 69% of them get their news from “Cable news shows.” I’m still not so jaded that this all doesn’t give me a sock in the gut.

Anyway, enough sensationalism about polls. The Pessoan Wealth Bondage briefly sheds his Paglian personae to discuss the difficulty in combatting what See the Forest describes as the Alinskyan moving of the goalposts:

The Republicans are now just an extension of the Scaife/Coors/Bradley, etc.-funded web of ideological think tanks and advocacy organizations–Heritage, Horowitz, Federalist Society, etc.–that call themselves “movement conservatives.” They have this magnificent “message amplification infrastructure” in place – the “Wurlitzer”–that is able to move the public more and more to the right, and their politicians just rest on top of that.

The WB responds with a pessimistic, expert analysis of the imbalance of forces, with a few long-term prescriptions for change:

Commweal is trying to be a populist counterpoise to Heritage and Cato, but has not got the bucks. When you go to a man who runs a billion dollar family business in a regulated industry, it is easy to explain to him why it might make sense to make a tax deductible gift of the interest on the interest on his money to Cato, to repeal the regulations that vex him. It is much tougher to make an equally cogent case for the common good.

But all the money in the world can’t turn this mess around in any short amount of time. The Right had a thirty year project that succeeded wildly, but it took time to reach the level of single-mindedness that See the Forest describes. Even after you read Mark Hertzgaard’s On Bended Knee, which describes the pandering of the press and the excuses they made for Reagan, it’s noticeable that due to Democratic control of Congress, some remaining press independence, or other factors, Iran-Contra still “happened.” The positions of the goalposts would not allow it on the radar now.

So even for them, these things took time. But I’m not in the mood to wait around for the supposed Emerging Democratic Majority to emerge. The crisis point seems too close. And it’s harder to foment a majority than to break one, as Ray Davis suggests:

Introduce enough irresolvable conflicts, and the “right” coalition would splinter into factions almost as nicely as the “left”: it has in the past, and it can again. (Bearing in mind, of course, that, no matter what loose coalitions might be in play, the most powerful single faction in American politics will continue to be, as it’s been since the Civil War, that represented by corporate lobbyists.)

It has to be a bad sign when that last, parenthetical sentence reads as a statement of optimism rather than despair. But that’s where I am right now. Temporarily, the preservation of a neo-liberal market with ludicrous income inequity and a lack of checks on corporatism is looking better than all other feasible alternatives (isolationist protectionism, aggressive warmongering imperialism, total multipolar chaos) in the short-term. Maybe it’s a lack of imagination on my part, or a lack of empathy for the victims of its tremendous defects, but what is going on right now is not in the interests of a majority of corporate lobbyists, even in this country. You don’t see articles like the Financial Times calling Bush’s economic policy “lunacy” unless at least the beginning of a rift similar to what Ray describes is forming. The best thing to do is help it along.

My response to the Tutor of WB, then, is that not all right-wing foundations pose equally frightening agendas, nor are they all marching in lockstep as much as current events suggest. The neocons and fundamentalists at Heritage and AEI are not the same as the welfare-bashing libertarians at Cato. It would not be the end of the world for progressives to welcome Cato into the fold temporarily, since they too have expressed reservations (see their Why the United States Should Not Attack Iraq”) about the current direction of the U.S. policy. In the face of patent financial mismanagement, there is room for a schism.

Of course, maybe the free-marketers don’t need us and can just fight it out amongst themselves. But in the face of the left-wing impotence that all the people I’ve quoted bemoan, one potential short-term approach is a strategic alliance–I don’t know what form it would take–between the progressive sorts and those who want a tax cut, easy living, and a reduction of inculcated fear. Sanity precedes social justice.

Analytic Philosophy: Doctor Fact is Knocking at the Door!

Gary Sauer-Thompson delivers a missive on the evolution of analytic philosophy:

Many toiled in the analytic vineyard in the noonday sun to show that we were only looking at a picture not absolute truth. Dewey, Wittgenstein, Kuhn, Putnam, Charles Taylor come to mind. Their labors succeeded in breaking the stranglehold of a science-centered expert culture in the liberal university; a culture obsessed with its theory of everything written in a few equations, a hostility to the common life and a big contempt for a literary culture.

I don’t disagree with the sentiment, but analytic philosophy, and its particular pretenses and failings, deserves closer examination.

Analytic philosophy started off at the extreme. Proto-analytics like Frege and Russell lay the groundwork for a verificationist model of the world. The confusion that arose post-Wittgenstein came from the Viennese Circle’s appropriation of what they thought was a dismissal of metaphysical statements as nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. What the analytics broke early on was the hold of metaphysics. Carl Hempel’s early papers are dismissive of anything that can’t be assigned a definitive truth value. Rudolph Carnap, one of the most extreme of the logical positivists, shows a great esteem for science, but disapproves of the culture surrounding it; science is too metaphysical for him.

But over time, analytics made the move back towards some notion of metaphysics. They did so using the most mathematical and scientific language possible, leading into endless discussions of material constitution, possible worlds, and debates between essentialism and non-essentialism.

The more esoteric blends of analytic philosophy maintained pretenses of scientific rigor. Willard Quine and Wilfred Sellars approached metaphysics as Frege had approached math and dug themselves into logically consistent but terribly obscure holes. Quine refined and rewrote Wittgenstein’s logical atomism into a network of interdependent atoms, none independent, even while tearing down traditional concepts of metaphysics.

Yet it was the more constructivist approaches, like those that came from Kripke, that caught on. By positing essential “things” with essential and non-essential properties, entirely new problems could be generated that led to statements with definite truth values, statements claiming basic metaphysical principles. Consider normative ethics, with its calculi of moral standing and well-being. It is the study of the mathematical manipulation of what psychologists can’t quantify.

The irony here, I always thought, was that it was the reintroduction of debatable metaphysics that gave analytic philosophy its power. The early verificationist approaches hit a dead end so quickly that there was almost no place to go but to metaphysics, and to establish a set of dogma as a tradition to work within, rather than as assumptions to be questioned. The debate between nominalists (those believing in particulars) and realists (those believing in universals) would have been anathema to Carl Hempel and the positivists in the 30’s, but not to their scions (and even some of them themselves–I know Hempel mellowed considerably) thirty to forty years later. Bernard Williams and David Armstrong had at least as much influence as Quine, because their approaches were more conducive towards productive work, and the manufacturing of problems to be debated and solved. An outstanding thinker like Donald Davidson sometimes seems shackled by assumptions, like the bugbear of the mental/physical divide, that his papers have to work within.

But I’d argue that it’s these restrictions and these signposts that allowed When Rorty attempted, with only partial success, to tear the house down by bringing in relativism (cultural and otherwise) and pragmatism, the metaphysics held it up. The edifice was too strong and too full of shared assumptions to fall victim to an attack that went in the wrong direction, tearing down rather than building up.

(I’d also say that Rorty’s approach is not especially compatible with continental thinkers for the same reason: his version of pragmatism is too destructive towards cultural theory, and possibly even towards pure deconstruction. But that’s a different subject….)

Erving Goffman on the Thoughtless Kind

Finally, consider that whatever else an announcer does, he must talk to listeners who are not there in the flesh. Because talk is learned, developed, and ordinarily practiced in connection with the visual and audible response of immediately present recipients, a radio announcer must inevitably talk as if responsive others were before his eyes and ears. (Television announcers are even more deeply committed to this condition than are radio announcers.) In brief, announcers must conjure up in their mind’s eye the notion of listeners, and act as though these phantoms were physically present to be addressed through gaze, body orientation, voice calibrated for distance, and the like. In a fundamental sense, then, broadcasting involves self-constructed talk projected under the demands, gaze, and responsiveness of listeners who aren’t there.

So announcers must not only watch the birdie; they must talk to it. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that they will often slip into a simulation of talking with it. Thus, after a suitable pause, an announcer can verbally respond to what he can assume is the response his prior statement evoked, his prior statement itself having been selected as one to which a particular response was only to be expected. Or, by switching voices, he himself can reply to his own statement and then respond to the reply, thereby shifting from monologue to the enactment of dialogue.

Erving Goffman, “Radio Talk”

The other half is that listeners, confronted with the one-sided conversation, will tend to imagine themselves in the dialogue and attribute to themselves responses which the broadcaster is assuming them to have had. When someone gets involved who doesn’t play by the rules, there is less offense than there is dissonance, since the script is broken:

BROWN: Well I hope that soldiers in the field aren’t looking at CNN but I think, it strikes me, Dr. Ellsberg, that we veered a little there. Let me try and re-frame the question. If the Iraqi political strategy is to use the anti-war movement to put pressure on the coalition to cease fire, don’t – whether that’s the case or not –

This is how I talk when I’m hitting someone up for something and I’m not sure if I’m going to get it. This is how a greenhorn activist speaks when they solicit donations. I wouldn’t mind hearing it more often.

(Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers to The New York Times in the days when they would print something like that. I wasn’t around then–was it better? Was it worse?)

My question is, what would Goffman’s model say about weblogs and the discourse on such? There’s plenty that’s been said about the absence of vocal and visual cues; that’s not as interesting as the extent to which the momentary (minutes/hours/days) absence of response allows the sort of construction Goffman discusses.

One theory: the vicious and petty squabbles (often in disguised form) that run rampant on newsgroups, blogs, chatrooms, comments boards–whatever–are partly an attempt to repossess and re-envisage the other person while they’re not present. I post a comment to you, you one-up me by shifting context, I try to pull back even further to the big picture, you accuse me of missing the point. The time dilation allows for a lot of little appropriations of authority without ever seating power firmly in one place.

Another theory: this authority granted to bloggers and even those who comment on their boards has generated such a diaspora of promulgated self- and other-images that they (a) blur together, or (b) cancel each other out. The average volume and heatedness of the discourse grows in an attempt to compensate for consequent insecurity.

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